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Abstract
In the Mobile Ambients of Cardelli and Gordon an ambient is a unit for mobility,
which may contain processes (data) and sub-ambients. Since the seminal work of
Cardelli and Gordon, several ambient-based calculi have been proposed (Seal, Box-
, Safe Ambients, Secure Safe Ambients, Boxed Ambients), mainly for supporting
security. At the operational level these (box- and) ambient-based calculi dier only
in the capabilities of processes. We propose a way of extending ambient-based
calculi, which embodies two principles: an ambient is a unit for monitoring
and coordination, the name of an ambient determines its (monitoring and
coordination) policy. More specically, to each ambient we attach a guardian,
which monitors the activity of sub-components (i.e. processes and sub-ambients)
and the interaction with the external environment. In our proposal, guardians
and processes play a dual role: guardians are centralized entities monitoring and
inhibiting actions, while processes are decentralized entities performing actions. We
exemplify the use of guardians for enforcing security properties.
1 Introduction
Specifying and verifying the security requirements of wide area network (WAN)
applications is a diÆcult task. A WAN application may integrate heteroge-
neous computing environments having dierent security requirements. More-
over, the security policy cannot make any decision using knowledge of the
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entire current state of the WAN application. Any realistic approach will iden-
tify which portion of the state of the WAN application is potentially relevant
and may aect or be aected by the security policy decisions. Lastly, security
policies are not static in general: the revocation of previously granted access
rights must be supported. Hence, formal models of security must provide
suitable mechanisms to specify and certify properties of a variety of security
policies, including policy changes and dynamic policies.
In the last years, several research activities have explored approaches where
security of WAN applications is enforced by programming language tech-
niques: language-based security. Following Schneider, Morrisett and Harper
[41], we can basically distinguish two dierent approaches to language-based
security: Program analysis, and Program transformation.
The approach based on program analysis requires a full knowledge of the
code of the application. The code is analyzed (either statically or dynami-
cally) against the security policy. The approach ensures that only the code
which does not violate the security policy will be granted the opportunity of
being executed. The security types for access control of (see e.g. [11,18,29])
provide nice examples of this approach. Another interesting example is given
by the (static and dynamic) techniques employed in modeling Java security
permissions (see e.g. [48,38,3,25]).
In the approach based on program transformation the operations enforc-
ing the security policies are merged into the code of the application. The
underlying idea is that of a reference monitor which observes execution and
halts the application whenever the application violates some security require-
ments. Here we can distinguish between in-lined Reference Monitors (IRM)
and Execution Monitoring (EM). In the IRM approach the application code
is enriched with some additional code performing security checks at run-time.
This implies that the events that may aect the security policy are known
in advance [21]. Execution monitoring applies when the application code is
not available in advance. Hence the application code must be treated as a
black-box and it must be wrapped inside a reference monitor [23].
This paper introduces a formal model capable of supporting specication
of multiple dynamic security policies. The basic idea of the model is the sepa-
ration between the computational mechanisms (communication and mobility
primitives) and the managers, we call them guardians, that enforce the se-
curity policies. Each guardian basically denes a local security context that
controls only a portion of the current state. However, a certain degree of
coordination among guardians is needed to support inter-networking security
policies. Our proposal is closely related to the idea of execution monitoring
and guardians are like security automata [21] that specify the allowed inter-
actions. The novelty of our approach is given by guardian coordination. The
coordination of guardians enables to support a rich set of security policies. In
other words, the security policies are programmable distributed entities.
The main features of our approach are summarized as follows
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
The distinction between the computational mechanisms (processes act) and
the security supports (guardians allow and deny) permits describing a va-
riety of local security policies. Keeping the specication of actions and
that of permissions separate is important also from a software engineering
prospective.

A guardian provides a unit to describe the local security policy: the set
of permissions that may be granted to the agents entering, exiting and
communicating in the monitored computational environment.

Security decisions are the outcome of coordination activities among guardians
which are location-aware. The coordinated security decisions control the
propagation of access rights by ensuring that the permissions are in accor-
dance with the local security policies.
In this paper, to demonstrate the applicability of the approach we intro-
duce a calculus of guardians. We choose as starting point of our investigation
the Boxed Ambient (BA) [5,6]. This variant of the mobile ambients calculus
[13] drops the open capability and introduce ne-grain mechanisms for ambient
interactions (inspired by the Seal calculus [15]). These changes provide better
support for the specication of security policies. The calculus of guardians
preserves the distinctive features of Boxed Ambients but it does not rely on a
type system to enforce secure ambient interactions. In our approach ambients
are equipped with guardians which monitor the activities of the components
inside an ambient and their interactions with the external operational envi-
ronment. Hence, each guardian denes and enforces a local security policy
and guardian coordination xes the permissions for ambient movements.
To illustrate our approach, we present a simple example of resource access
control specied in BA. We consider a system s which consists of a resource
r and a mobile process n that wants to use r
s[Q j n[P ] j r[R]]
Let us assume that the resource r consists of a value v, thus R is the process
!hvi:0, and that using the resource amounts to read the value v. For instance,
process P is in r:(x)
"
:P
0
, i.e. n enters r and reads a value from the parent
ambient r. We attach a guardian G
a
to each ambient a, therefore in our
calculus the system above becomes
s(G
s
)[Q j n(G
n
)[P ] j r(G
r
)[R]]
The expression n(G)[P ] indicates that ambient n runs process P under the
control of guardian G. We exemplify the coordination among guardians by
considering what happens when process P tries to perform the in r action:
(i) G
n
authorizes, within ambient s, migration (of ambient n) into r;
(ii) G
r
authorizes, within ambient s, ambient n to enter inside (ambient r);
(iii) G
s
authorizes the movement of ambient n inside ambient r.
In other words, the permission granted for the ambient movement is the result
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of a coordination step of four entities: the process asking for the service and
the three guardians G
n
, G
r
and G
s
implementing the local security contexts
of the ambients involved in the action. The agreement among four entities
needed to perform ambient movements may appear to have a heavy run-time
overhead. However, if one considers a low-level description of an ambient move
(e.g. see [22,39]), it involves exactly three ambients and the process performing
the movement action.
Notice that the coordination step adheres to the principles of subsidiarity,
i.e. only the ambients directly involved in the action can forbid it, and lo-
cation awareness, e.g. guardian G
n
authorizes the movement only within the
enclosing ambient s. The outcome of the move action is
s(G
0
s
)[Q j r(G
0
r
)[n(G
0
n
)[(x)
"
:P
0
] j R]]
The reading of the value in r requires the coordination of four entities, namely
the processes and guardians in r and n. In particular, the guardian G
0
r
must
authorize the read from the child ambient n. The outcome of the read action
is
s(G
0
s
)[Q j r(G
00
r
)[n(G
00
n
)[P
0
[x: = v]] j R]]
In this paper we will show that guardians are powerful enough to enforce
dynamically a variety of security policies. For instance, focusing on the re-
source access control example, the guardian G
r
can

prevent certain ambients to enter depending on their name,

allow a very limited pattern of interaction, e.g. a protocol of the form read
only once and then exit (otherwise, the agent n could perform multiple
read),

perform check for intrusion detection , e.g. the agent n could be used as a
Trojan horse by other ambients that want to enter r,

discriminate among ambients having the same name by granting them dif-
ferent privileges.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review
Boxed Ambients. Section 3 introduces the calculus of guardians for Boxed
Ambients and its basic semantic theory. Section 4 discusses several examples
that illustrate the expressive power of guardians to enforce a wide range of
security protocols. Finally, comparisons with related work are in Section 5.
2 Boxed Ambients: an ambient-based language
In this section we present Boxed Ambients [5] (BA, in the rest of the paper),
an ambient-based language inspired by Mobile Ambients [13]. BA uses the
same mobility primitives as Mobile Ambients, but relies on a dierent com-
munication model inspired by the Seal calculus [15]. This model results from
dropping the open primitive and permitting communication across ambient
boundaries, between parent and children, in addition to local communication.
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Our presentation of syntax and operational semantics of BA diers from the
original one for a few aspects, namely:

We do not distinguish between the syntactic categories of values and (se-
quential) processes;

We consider additional process actions corresponding to name, process and
ambient creation. This renement makes a dierence when we introduce
guardians that may forbid a process action to occur, even when in the
calculus without guardians the action was asynchronous and non-blocking.

For better programmability, we introduce also sequential composition (which
subsumes concatenation of capabilities), conditional choice, and recursive
denitions (instead of replication).

We dene the transition relation for nets, i.e. processes modulo structural
congruence. Intuitively, sequential processes (i.e. values) are syntactic enti-
ties, while nets are semantic entities that describe the state of a system at
a given moment of the computation.
The syntax of the calculus is given by the following BNF
n 2 Name: : = : : :
x 2 Var: : = : : :
X 2 PId: : = : : :
b 2 Bool: : = ? j b
1
_ b
2
j > j b
1
^ b
2
j :b j v
1
= v
2
name equality
a 2 Act: : = new j spawn j box j in j out j wr j wrup j wrdn j rd j rdup j rddn
v; P 2 Proc: : = n j x j a(v; ?x):P j P
1
;P
2
j 1 j if b then P
1
else P
2
j X(v)
Syntactically, a process P may also be a name n or a variable x, of course
semantically these are values but not processes (thus they do not give rise
to process transitions). Action prex a(v; ?x):P represents a process that
can perform action a: v is a sequence of values (actual parameters), and
x is a sequence of variables (formal parameters), which may occur free in
P . The formal parameters x are replaced by actual parameters v
0
through
synchronization (with other processes), thus a(v; ?x):P binds the variables x
in P . P
1
;P
2
is sequential composition, and 1 denotes successful termination.
Finally, we have conditional choice and process invocation X(v), where we
assume that for each process identier X (of arity n) there exists a unique
dening equation X(x)

= P (where x has length n).
With respect to the original presentation of BA, we use three additional
actions: new(?x):P is a request for a fresh name to a name generator, thus
it corresponds to (x)P of BA; spawn(P
1
):P
2
activates P
1
in parallel with P
2
,
thus it corresponds to P
1
jP
2
of BA; box(n; P
1
):P
2
spawns P
1
in a new ambient
named n, thus it corresponds to n[P
1
]jP
2
of BA.
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The remaining actions directly correspond to those of BA. The actions
in(n):P and out(n):P are for ambients movement. The actions wr(v):P and
rd(?x):P are for local communication: wr(v):P outputs the sequence of val-
ues v, rd(?x):P inputs a sequence of values and binds them to the sequence
of variables x. The actions wrup(v):P and rdup(?x):P are the actions for
communication with the parent and work similarly, while wrdn(n; v):P and
rddn(n; ?x):P are for communication with a child named n.
In [5], the operational semantics of BA is dened in terms of a struc-
tural congruence and a reduction relation over processes. Here, the opera-
tional semantics is given by a transition relation ===) over nets, where a
net N is basically a process modulo structural congruence. Net transitions
F;N ===) F
0
; N
0
are dened in term of process transitions P
a(v)
> P
0
. This
distinction is convenient, since guardians are synchronized with process tran-
sitions (not with net transitions).
Process termination (denoted by P #) is a predicate which expresses whether
P may successfully terminate. This predicate is exploited for dening the
transitions of the sequential composition of processes.
1
1 #
rec
P [x: = v] #
X(v) #
if X(x)

= P ;
P
1
# P
2
#
P
1
;P
2
#
ift
b true P
1
#
if b then P
1
else P
2
#
i
b false P
2
#
if b then P
1
else P
2
#
Process transition P
a(v)
> P
0
, where v is a sequence of closed values (i.e.
without free variables), is a predicate saying that P may perform action a(v)
and become P
0
. The rules for action prex are of the form
a
a(
v
; ?
x
):P
a(v;v
0
)
> P [x: = v
0
]
with restrictions on v and v
0
that depend on a.
new
new(?x):P
new(n)
> P [x: = n]
spawn
spawn(P
1
):P
2
spawn(P
1
)
> P
2
box
box(n; P
1
):P
2
box(n
1
;P
1
)
> P
2
in
in(n):P
in(n)
> P
out
out(n):P
out(n)
> P
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wr
wr(v):P
wr(v)
> P
rd
rd(?x):P
rd(v)
> P [x: = v]
wrup
wrup(
v
):P
wrup(v)
> P
rdup
rdup(?
x
):P
rdup(v)
> P [x: = v]
wrdn
wrdn(n; v):P
wrdn(n;v)
> P
rddn
rddn(n; ?x):P
rddn(n;v)
> P [x: = v]
The rest of the rules are fairly standard.
rec
P [x: = v]
a(v)
> P
0
X(v)
a(v)
> P
0
if X(x)

= P
;f
P
1
a(v)
> P
0
1
P
1
;P
2
a(v)
> P
0
1
;P
2
;c
P
1
# P
2
a(v)
> P
0
2
P
1
;P
2
a(v)
> P
0
2
ift
b true P
1
a(v)
> P
0
1
if b then P
1
else P
2
a(v)
> P
0
1
i
b false P
2
a(v)
> P
0
2
if b then P
1
else P
2
a(v)
> P
0
2
The rules for conditional choice rely on the evaluation of boolean expressions
b. The rules for deriving b true and b false are obvious, only those for name
equality deserve to be mentioned
=t
n = n true
=f
n
1
= n
2
false
if n
1
6= n
2
Notice that the boolean expression v
1
= v
2
has a value only when v
1
and
v
2
are names, since in the other cases the comparison makes no sense.
Remark 2.1 We do not dene an observational congruence on processes, but
any such congruence will validate at least the equations saying that (1; ; ) forms
a monoid. 2
We can now dene net transitions for BA. Formally, a net N 2 Net

=
(Proc+(NameNet)) is a multi-set of processes P and named sub-nets n[N ].
We dene transitions on named nets n[N ], since we want to have always a top-
level ambient n (with an associated guardian) that overlooks the evolution of
the net (on the contrary in Ambient-like calculi, transitions are dened on
generic processes). Net transitions are dened over congurations of the form
F; n[N ], where F 
fin
Name contains all the free names in n[N ]. F keeps
track of the names that are free in the whole net (i.e. names generated so
far) and is needed to ensure global freshness of names. When a transition
does not generate any fresh names, we write n[N ] ====) n[N
0
] instead of
F; n[N ] ===) F; n[N
0
]. Net transitions F; n[N ] ===) F
0
; n[N
0
] are dened in
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terms of a structural rule
F; n
2
[N
2
] ===) F
0
; n
2
[N
0
2
]
F; n
1
[N
1
; n
2
[N
2
]] ===) F
0
; n
1
[N
1
; n
2
[N
0
2
]]
and basic net transitions induced by process transitions. For each of these
net transitions we name the ambients involved (actively or passively) in the
transition (an ambient is active when one of its processes takes part to the
action/interaction that causes the transition). The basic net transitions are
classied in three groups.
Asynchronous and non-blocking transitions:
new
P
new(n
0
)
> P
0
F; n[N;P ] ===) F [ fn
0
g; n[N;P
0
]
n
0
62 F n is active
spawn
P
spawn(P
1
)
> P
2
n[N;P ] ===) n[N;P
1
; P
2
]
n is active
box
P
box(n
1
;P
1
)
> P
2
n[N;P ] ===) n[N;n
1
[P
1
]; P
2
]
n is active
Asynchronous and possibly blocking transitions:
in
P
in(n
2
)
> P
0
n[N;n
1
[P;N
1
]; n
2
[N
2
]] ===) n[N;n
2
[n
1
[P
0
; N
1
]; N
2
]]
out
P
out(n
2
)
> P
0
n[N;n
2
[n
1
[P;N
1
]; N
2
]] ===) n[N;n
1
[P
0
; N
1
]; n
2
[N
2
]]
In the rules above we assume that n
1
is active, and n, n
2
are passive.
Synchronous transitions:
comm
P
1
wr(v)
> P
0
1
P
2
rd(v)
> P
0
2
n[N;P
1
; P
2
] ===) n[N;P
0
1
; P
0
2
]
n is active
rdup
P
1
wr(v)
> P
0
1
P
2
rdup(v)
> P
0
2
n
1
[N
1
; P
1
; n
2
[P
2
; N
2
]] ===) n
1
[N
1
; P
0
1
; n
2
[P
0
2
; N
2
]]
n
1
and n
2
active
wrup
P
1
rd(v)
> P
0
1
P
2
wrup(v)
> P
0
2
n
1
[N
1
; P
1
; n
2
[P
2
; N
2
]] ===) n
1
[N
1
; P
0
1
; n
2
[P
0
2
; N
2
]]
n
1
and n
2
active
rddn
P
1
rddn(n
2
;v)
> P
0
1
P
2
wr(v)
> P
0
2
n
1
[N
1
; P
1
; n
2
[P
2
; N
2
]] ===) n
1
[N
1
; P
0
1
; n
2
[P
0
2
; N
2
]]
n
1
and n
2
active
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wrdn
P
1
wrdn(n
2
;v)
> P
0
1
P
2
rd(v)
> P
0
2
n
1
[N
1
; P
1
; n
2
[P
2
; N
2
]] ===) n
1
[N
1
; P
0
1
; n
2
[P
0
2
; N
2
]]
n
1
and n
2
active
3 Guarded Boxed Ambients: an extension with guardians
In this section we describe Guarded Boxed Ambients (GBA for short), i.e.
the extension of BA with guardians. The basic idea is that a guardian G
perform transitionsG
g(v)
> G
0
(where v is a sequence of closed values) formally
similar to process transitions. However, a guardian transition amounts to a
permission for a process action (or interaction). The syntax of GBA is given
by the grammar below. Here, we show only the new and extended syntactic
categories, all the other categories are unchanged.
W 2 GId: : = : : :
g 2 Perm: : = new j spawn j box j in
1
j in
2
j in
3
j out
1
j out
2
j out
3
j comm
j rdup
1
j rdup
2
j wrup
1
j wrup
2
j rddn
1
j rddn
2
j wrdn
1
j wrdn
2
G 2 Gard: : = g(x) when b then G j G
1
_G
2
j W (v) j
Gng(x) when b j ? j > j G
1
^G
2
v; P 2 Proc: : = : : : j G
Remark 3.1 Permissions are given by the syntactic category Perm. There is
one permission g for each basic net transition and each ambient n
involved in the transition. Intuitively, g(v) means that the guardian G (of
ambient n) permits the basic net transition, provided the parameters of the
transitions (and the names of the other ambients involved) are those specied
in v. Therefore, the role of guardians is exclusively to constrain the
actions (and interactions) of processes. 2
We take as basic construct for guardians g(x) when b then G, where g
is a permission, x is a sequence of variables bound by the construct, b is a
boolean expression, and G is a guardian. The other constructs for guardians
are inspired by synchronous process calculi, like SCCS [33]. Of course, there
are many other process algebra formalisms to choose from, but synchronous
calculi appear particularly appropriate for stressing the monolithic nature of
guardians, i.e. one guardian per ambient. A guardian G is fully specied by
giving a system of equations hW
i
(x)

= G
i
j i 2 Ii dening the meaning of
every W used in G and the G
i
.
Remark 3.2 For dening guardians the dynamic combinators given in the
rst row of the BNF suÆce. However, the static combinators given in the
second row are quite convenient derived forms. 2
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The syntactic category Proc of processes and values is extended with a new
production G, since values now include also guardians.
The operational semantics is given by a transition relation ==) over nets
with guardians, which is dened in terms of process transitions P
a(v)
> P
0
and
guardian transitions G
g(v)
> G
0
.

Process transitions are dened by the rules in Section 2, but the rule for
name creation is now
new
new(?x;G):P
new(n;G[x:=n])
> P [x: = n]
In GBA the prex new(?x;G):P is a request for a fresh name, the guardian
G is like a type for the new name, and the association name-guardian obeys
the rules for static scoping.

Guardian transitions are dened by the following rules
allow
b[x: = v] true
g(x) when b then G
g(v)
> G[x: = v]
v closed
or
G
i
g(v)
> G
0
G
1
_G
2
g(v)
> G
0
i 2 f1; 2g W
G[x: = v
0
]
g(v)
> G
0
W (
v
0
)
g(v)
> G
0
W (x)

= G
deny
1
:b[x: = v] true G
g(v)
> G
0
Gng(x) when b
g(v)
> G
0
ng(x) when b
deny
2
G
g
0
(v)
> G
0
Gng(x) when b
g
0
(v)
> G
0
ng(x) when b
g
0
6= g
and
G
1
g(v)
> G
0
1
G
2
g(v)
> G
0
2
G
1
^G
2
g(v)
> G
0
1
^G
0
2
>
>
g(v)
> >
v closed
Remark 3.3 We do not dene an observational congruence on guardians, but
any such congruence will validate at least the following equational properties:

(?;_) and (>;^) form commutative idempotent monoids;

distributivity of (?;_) over ^, i.e. ? ^G = ? and
(G
1
_G
2
) ^G = (G
1
^G) _ (G
2
^G);

commutativity of ng(x) when b with ?, _ and ^, i.e. ?ng(x) when b = ?,
(G
1
_G
2
)ng(x) when b = (G
1
ng(x) when b)_(G
2
ng(x) when b), and similarly
for ^.
2
We can now dene net transitions for GBA. Formally, a net with guardians
M 2 GNet

= (Proc + (Name  Gard  GNet)) is a multi-set of processes P
61
Ferrari, Moggi, Pugliese
and named sub-nets n(G)[M ] with guardians. Net transitions are dened over
congurations of the form F; n(G)[M ], where F :Name
fin
! Gard associates a
guardian to the names generated so far. F is like a global environment, which
is extended when a fresh name is generated, and is looked up when a new
ambient is created (i.e. a box action is performed). When a transition does
not generate any fresh names, we write n(G)[M ] ===) n(G
0
)[M
0
] instead of
F; n(G)[M ] ===) F
0
; n(G
0
)[M
0
].
Net transitions F; n(G)[M ] ===) F
0
; n(G
0
)[M
0
] are dened in terms of a
structural rule (similar to that for BA)
sub-net
F; n
2
(G
2
)[M
2
] ===) F
0
; n
2
(G
0
2
)[M
0
2
]
F; n
1
(G
1
)[M
1
; n
2
(G
2
)[M
2
]] ===) F
0
; n
1
(G
1
)[M
1
; n
2
(G
0
2
)[M
0
2
]]
and basic net transitions, classied in three groups (as before), activated by
process transitions, but with additional premises corresponding to the permis-
sions granted by the guardians of ambients involved in the transition.
Asynchronous and non-blocking transitions:
new
P
new(n
1
;G
1
)
> P
0
G
new(n
1
;G
1
)
> G
0
F; n(G)[M;P ] ===) F [n
1
7! G
1
]; n(G
0
)[M;P
0
]
n
1
62 dom(F )
spawn
P
spawn(P
1
)
> P
2
G
spawn(P
1
)
> G
0
n(G)[M;P ] ===) n(G
0
)[M;P
1
; P
2
]
box
P
box(n
1
;P
1
)
> P
2
G
box(n
1
;P
1
)
> G
0
F; n(G)[M;P ] ===) F; n(G
0
)[M;n
1
(G
1
)[P
1
]; P
2
]
G
1
= F (n
1
)
In (new) the process P requesting a fresh name must provide a guardian for
it, thus the association name-guardian is established at name-generation time
(and recorded in the partial function F ). In (box) the guardian for the new
ambient is recovered from F , while the process running in the new ambient is
xed at ambient-generation-time.
Asynchronous and possibly blocking transitions:
in
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0
G
1
in
1
(n;n
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0
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2
)
> G
0
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Synchronous transitions:
comm
P
1
wr(v)
> P
0
1
P
2
rd(v)
> P
0
2
G
comm(v)
> G
0
n(G)[M;P
1
; P
2
] ===) n(G
0
)[M;P
0
1
; P
0
2
]
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rdup
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Remark 3.4 In a net with guardians, when a new ambient with name n is
created (i.e. when a box action is performed), we must provide a guardian
for the new ambient. In GBA we have decided that the guardian for the new
ambient is provided by the process that created the name n (by performing
a new action). We review the alternatives, and discuss their pros and cons.
There are four entities that may provide the guardian for a new ambient:
(i) the process P
n
that did the new action for creating n;
(ii) the guardian G
n
for process P
n
;
(iii) the process P
b
that does the box action spawning n[P ];
(iv) the guardian G
b
for process P
b
.
Options i and iii make processes aware of guardians. Options i and ii require a
global environment to record the guardian to be used when an ambient named
n is created. Option ii is too generic, since G
n
does not know how P
n
plan
to use n, so it will provide a guardian that is the same for all new names.
Option iii appears the most exible, since the guardian for the new ambient is
decided at ambient-generation-time. We have chosen option i, which is more
rigid, but also more secure, and it embodies the principle one name one
policy. 2
Denition 3.5 [Erasure] Given M 2 GNet, the net jM j 2 Net is obtained by
removing all guardians occurring in M .
jM j could be formally dened by induction on the structure ofM . The fol-
lowing property says that the introduction of guardians has only an inhibitory
eect on net transitions.
Proposition 3.6 If M ===)M
0
, then jM j===) jM
0
j
We conclude this section by giving a few simple examples of guardians,
that are dynamic surrogates for static types:

?, nothing is permitted. In n(?)[M ] the sub-nets are still able to evolve,
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but in isolation.

>, everything is permitted.

Immobile = >nout
1
(x)nin
1
(x) forces immobility: the net n(Immobile)[M ]
cannot move.

Shh = >ncomm(x) forbid local communications,

Comm() = >ncomm(x) when :x:  restricts local communications to
values of type  (we need a predicate :  , that performs dynamic type-
checking).
There is no way to dene a guardian corresponding to the single-thread types
of Safe Ambients [31], however one can prevent the creation of new threads
by forbidding the spawn action.
Remark 3.7 One may wonder how much run-time overhead is introduced
by the execution monitoring performed by guardians. In the case of ambient
movements (in) and (out), the agreement among four entities is a faithful rep-
resentation of what happens in the distributed abstract machines for Mobile
Ambients [22] and for Safe Ambients [39]. The asynchronous message-passing
protocol of [22] could be used to split the synchronization among four entities
required in rules (in) and (out) into multiple synchronization steps each in-
volving only two entities. The splitting could give rise to a number of blocking
situations, that were not present in the original semantics but can be permis-
sible because we are mainly interested to safety properties. Similarly, the
implementation of boxed ambient communications would require multi-parts
cooperations. In all other cases the synchronization with guardians represents
a real overhead. This overhead could be reduced by adopting asynchronous
communication, which amounts to having one data repository per ambient
(thus the synchronization with the guardian corresponds to the interaction
with the data repository).
The rules (new) and (box) introduce an overhead related to the extension
and access to the environment F mapping names to guardians. This envi-
ronment can be extended, but an association is never overwritten, thus some
simple caching technique can substantially reduce the overhead.
Finally, we discuss the rule (spawn). A BA/GBA process can be thought
of as a thread executing one action at a time. Therefore, the action spawn(P )
corresponds to a system call requesting to start a new thread executing P
(thus the synchronization with the guardian corresponds to the interaction
with the operating system). At present a guardian cannot discriminate be-
tween complex values (only between names). However, by extending boolean
expressions with new predicates on values (besides name equality), one could
envisage that the permission for spawning a new thread is based on a run-time
analysis of P . 2
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4 Examples
In this section we provide several examples that show the expressivity of
guardians to dynamically enforce security policies. To this purpose we will
describe in our calculus some ambient interaction protocols that have been
already discussed in the literature to point out and discuss advantages and
weaknesses of ambient-like calculi. In the examples, we may use the derived
forms g(p) then G and Gng(p), where p: : = x j n j are patterns. The meaning
of the derived forms is the obvious one, e.g.

g(x) then G corresponds to g(x) when > then G

g(n) then G corresponds to g(x) when x = n then G, with x 62 FV(G)

g( ) then G corresponds to g(x) when > then G, with x 62 FV(G).
The guardians presented in the examples seem to fall into two classes:
everything is allowed unless explicitly forbidden (exploiting the \deny" com-
binator), only a very limited pattern of interaction is allowed (exploiting the
dynamic combinators: \allow", \choice" and \recursion"). The \and" com-
binator is not used in the examples. It could be used to compose guardians
implementing elementary policies into more structured ones, as it is the case
for passive composition of wrappers [23].
4.1 Firewall
The rewall protocol (see [12,31,6]) has been introduced to examine which are
the activities needed to control accesses through a rewall. In this protocol,
ambient f describes a rewall and we assume that the name of the rewall must
always remain unknown. An external agent a can enter the rewall f through
a pilot ambient k, however the external agent has no permissions to exit
from the rewall f (thus carrying condential information, like the name f ,
outside). The following net (without guardians) describes the initial congu-
ration: a[in(k):out(k):P
a
]; f [k[X
k
(f)]; P
f
] where X
k
(f)

= out(f):in(f):X
k
(f).
The intended behavior of the rewall protocol corresponds to the following
sequence of transitions:
a[in(k):out(k):P
a
]; f [k[X
k
(f)]; P
f
] k exits from f
a[in(k):out(k):P
a
]; k[in(f):X
k
(f)]; f [P
f
] a enters into k
k[a[out(k):P
a
]; in(f):X
k
(f)]; f [P
f
] k enters back into f
f [k[a[out(k):P
a
]; X
k
(f)]; P
f
] a exits from k
f [k[X
k
(f)]; a[P
a
]; P
f
] k is back in the initial state,
and a can interact with P
f
However, there are other sequences of transitions from the initial conguration
that give rise to a violation of the protocol. In particular a could get out of f
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(even if P
a
does not know the name f) by getting a lift back from k.
We now describe two simple guardians for f and k (W
f
and W
k
) that
dynamically enforce the intended security policy. No assumptions are made
on the guardian for a, since a malicious agent may have also a malicious
guardian.

W
k

= out
1
( ; x
f
) then in
2
( ; ) then in
1
( ; x
f
) then out
2
(x
f
; ) then W
k
The guardian W
k
describes a security policy that forces the following se-
quencing of actions:
(i) k exits from the enclosing ambient f (and x
f
is bound to f)
(ii) k allows one ambient to enter
(iii) k goes back into the ambient f
(iv) k allows one ambient to exit (while staying within f)
When these actions are terminated the pilot ambient k is back in its original
state.

W
f

= Immobilenin
2
( ; x) when x 6= knout
2
( ; x) when x 6= k
The guardian W
f
ensures immobility of the rewall and that only ambients
with name k are allowed to cross the rewall.
Notice that W
k
does not explicitly use the name f of the rewall, while W
f
uses the name k for pilot ambients. Since the association name-guardian is
made at name-generation-time, this means that the name k must be generated
before name f . However, this is not a strong constraint since we want to keep
f private, and thus it is better to generate it as late as possible, (i.e. just
before generating the ambient with name f).
One could argue that guardian W
f
is too restrictive. In particular, one
could adopt a simpler guardian for the rewall f that does not use k, e.g.W
f

=
Immobile. The requirement that the only ambient having the permission
to cross the rewall have name k might be ensured by other mechanisms.
However, this seems to require a careful design of P
f
(having much more
global assumptions), hence it does not appear to us as a viable option.
4.2 Train Movement
The train protocol (see [8]) can be described as follows: there is a train t
moving between two stations a and b, a passenger p can get in and out of the
train when it is in a station, but not when it is moving between stations. If
passenger p wants to get o at a certain station, he needs to be informed when
the train has reached that station. In [8] the example is modeled by exploiting
a new primitive for ambient renaming. Intuitively, the train ambient takes
a suitable name to implicitly inform the passengers when it has arrived at
a certain station, while it takes a name unknown to passengers when it is
moving (in this way passengers cannot get in or out of the train). The train
protocol provides a nice pictorial example of access control in presence of
mobility. We will model the access control decision by a coordination activity
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with a suitable ambient called announcement. Passengers are informed of the
arrival at a certain station by the ambient announcement (@a or @b) that is
generated by the train when it arrives at a station (a or b respectively).
Remark 4.1 In Mobile Ambients [13], ambient renaming can be expressed
in terms of the calculus primitives, although the translation does not preserve
atomicity and can give rise to unwanted interferences. On the contrary, in
GBA, ambient renaming is not internally representable in the calculus, but we
refrain from introducing it as a primitive since it is at odds with the principle
\one name one security policy". 2
The following net (without guardians) describes the initial conguration:
a[]; b[]; t[X
t
]; p[X
1
], where

X
t

= in(a):box(@a; out(t):0):out(a):in(b):box(@b; out(t):0):out(b):X
t
, i.e. the
train t moves between stations a and b.

X
1
models a generic passenger, e.g. X
1

= in(a):in(t):in(@b):out(@b):X
2
means: enter station a, get on train t, listen for the announcements @b,
get o at station b. After this, the passenger could exit station b, or get
on another train, say t
0
, to reach a third station c. This second behavior is
modeled by X
2

= in(t
0
):in(@c):out(@c):X
3
.
We now describe three guardians: W
s
for the stations a and b, W
@s
for the
announcements @a and @b, and W
t
for the train t. No assumptions are made
on the guardian for a passenger p:
W
s

= Immobile
W
@s

= in
2
( ; ) then W
@s
_
out
1
( ; ) then W
0
@s
W
0
@s

= out
2
( ; ) then W
0
@s
The guardian W
@s
forces the following sequencing of actions: rst passengers
enter @s, then @s moves out of the train, and nally passengers exit @s.
W
t

= in
1
( ; x
s
) then box(x
@s
; ) then W
t
(x
s
; x
@s
)
W
t
(x
s
; x
@s
)

= in
2
( ; ) then W
t
(x
s
; x
@s
)_
in
3
( ; x
@s
) then W
t
(x
s
; x
@s
)_
out
2
( ; x
@s
) then out
1
( ; x
s
) then W
t
The guardian W
t
describes the security policy of the train. First t arrives at
a station s and makes an announcement @s, then passengers get in (i.e. enter
t) or get o (i.e. enter @s), nally @s exit t and t leaves station s.
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4.3 Routable packet
In this protocol, from [13,30], a packet is used to drive some information to
various destinations. In our formulation, agent a uses a routable packet p to be
carried to its destination. The ambient p supports the following interactions:
it allows an agent a to enter p and to inform p of the route M for reaching
its nal destination. Then p executes the sequence of movements specied by
M , upon completion a exits from p and p returns in its original state.
The security requirements of this protocol are the following:

The routable packet p cannot perform actions specied in M that are not
movement actions;

The agent a should leave the packet only when the nal destination has
been reached;

No other agent should be allowed to enter inside the packet p until the
protocol has been completed.
The behavior of the agent and of the Routable packet are given below.

X
a

= in(p):wrup(M):out(p):P ,
where the action wrup spawns process M in the parent ambient of a (i.e.
in the routable packet p).

X
p

= rd(?x):new(?z;?):x; box(z; 1):X
p
,
where the box action after x is exploited to inform the guardian G
p
when
destination has been reached. Notice that since z is a fresh name, it is
unknown to x.
We now describe a guardian for the routable packet p. This guardian enforces
the sequencing of actions specied by the protocol, no matter how malicious
a is:
G
p
= in
2
( ; x
a
) then wrup
2
(x
a
) then new(z; ) then G
p
(z; x
a
)
G
p
(z; x
a
)= in
1
( ; ) then G
p
(z; x
a
) _
out
1
( ; ) then G
p
(z; x
a
) _
box
1
(z) then out
2
( ; x
a
) then G
p
G
p
guarantees that, e.g., two dierent routes cannot enter the packet p and
interfere with the path to follow. G
p
is not able to guarantee that eventually
p reaches the destination specied by M , unless all the ambients that are used
by M are immobile. Indeed, we cannot rely on the agent a to ensure this
property. However, we can modify G
p
to allow only movements in and out of
ambients that G
p
knows to be immobile (this means that the names of such
ambients must have been created before the name p).
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5 Related work
Policy enforcement mechanisms.
Several alternative approaches have been exploited to enforce security poli-
cies in networked computing systems. The approaches may dier in the level of
trust required, the exibility of the enforced security policy and their costs to
components producers and users. A comprehensive security framework could
result from the combination of complementary issues.
As pointed out in [42], approaches like code signing and sand-boxing (for
instance consider the Java implementation of these concepts [26,24]) have low
costs but cannot enforce exible security policies (signed components may
behave in arbitrary ways and the user must trust the component producer,
sand-boxed components are isolated and cannot interact with each other).
Three sensible and exible language-based techniques | type systems, in-
lined reference monitors, and certifying compilers | are pointed out and eval-
uated in [41]. Type systems (like, e.g., those used in [45,28]) statically analyze
the application code against the wanted security policy; they require a full
knowledge of the code, that must be written in conformance with the type
system, and usually do not need any run-time overhead. In-lined reference
monitors postpone (some of) the security checks at run-time, by inserting
additional code for enforcing the wanted security policy into the target appli-
cation. This technique has been used in Software Fault Isolation (see, e.g.,
[46]), and two implementations using security automata as a mechanism for
specifying security policies are presented in [21]. In [43,44], type specialization
is used to remove (in some cases) all run time safety checks from programs
transformed for in-lined monitored execution while guaranteeing the safety of
the transformed code. Certifying compilers produce object code along with
a certicate, i.e. a machine checkable evidence that the object code respects
certain security policies. This technique has been used, e.g, for generating
Proof-Carrying Code [34,35] and enforcing standard security policies (like type
and memory safety). In [47], it is shown that this technique can be used to
enforce any security policy that can be specied by a security automaton
4
(given a security automaton specifying the policy to be enforced, it is shown
how to insert run-time security checks during program compilation and how
to verify that the compiled code obeys the security policy).
Execution monitoring (EM, [40]) is a general class of enforcement mech-
anisms that work by monitoring execution steps of a target application and
by terminating execution that is about to violate the security policy being
enforced. EM mechanisms rely on security automata: the monitored applica-
tion is executed in tandem with a simulation of the automaton dening the
wanted security policy. EM mechanisms include, e.g., reference monitors and
security kernels, and are exible and expressive (they permit to enforce at
best safety policies). EM mechanisms are rather exible, since they are also
4
Security automata are very expressive, in fact they can specify every safety property [40].
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applicable to components for which only untyped object code is available and
whose internal structure cannot be analyzed.
Wrappers, i.e. code that encapsulates possibly untrusted components and
can intercept the communications between each such component and the rest
of the system, are signicant examples (see, e.g., [23,42]) of EM mechanisms.
In [23], a wrapper denition language for composing COTS software compo-
nents is dened along with a framework for wrappers management. In [42],
box-, a process calculus obtained as a minimal extension of the -calculus
with encapsulation, is dened and used for specifying wrappers that rigor-
ously implements security policies; a causal type system is then used for stati-
cally capturing the allowed information ows between wrapped, possibly badly
typed, components. Our proposal is closely related to the idea of execution
monitoring, and guardians are like security automata that specify the allowed
process actions and interactions.
Security techniques for Ambients-based languages.
A number of analysis techniques have been developed for the mobile ambi-
ents (MA, [13]) and its variants. Some of these techniques are proof systems
and modal logics [7], abstract interpretation [27], control and data ow anal-
ysis [37,36,19], denotational models [16,17]. However, the techniques closer to
security policies enforcement are based on type systems.
Many type disciplines have been developed for MA. In [12], exchange types
are introduced to discipline the exchange of values in communications. In
[9], immobility and locking annotations have been used for ensuring that only
ambients that are deemed mobile will move and that only ambients that are
deemed openable will be opened. In [10], by introducing the notion of group
names, the type of an ambient is rened to enable controlling the set of ambi-
ents it can cross and the set of ambients it can open. Finally, in [11], all these
type systems are reviewed and assessed in a common framework.
The safe ambients calculus (SA, [31,30]) is a variant of MA obtained by
adding co-capabilities to the base calculus thus enabling the ambient target
of a movement or object of an open action to control the interaction. A
distributed implementation of SA is described in [39]. SA permits dening
powerful and accurate type systems for controlling mobility. In [31,30], a type
discipline is introduced for controlling ambient mobility and removing grave
interferences by relying on single-threaded ambients (i.e. ambients which at
every step oer at most one interaction with external and internal ambients).
In [20], a type discipline is introduced that, by relying on a statically xed
hierarchy of security levels, ensures that ambients at a given security level can
only be crossed or opened by ambients at a greatest or equal security level. In
[4], a type system for expressing and verifying behavioral invariants of ambi-
ents (written in Secure SA, a typed variant of SA) is dened, by accounting
not only for immediate behavior but also for behavior resulting from capa-
bilities acquired by interacting with the surrounding environment. In order
70
Ferrari, Moggi, Pugliese
to develop equational theories to support reasoning on SA terms, in [32], a
labeled bisimilarity for a variant of SA enriched with passwords (and with a
dierent semantics for out) has been developed and proved to coincide with
barbed congruence.
The seal calculus [15] is variant of MA where the open primitive has been
dropped, ambient communication relies on located channels and can also take
place across ambient boundaries (between parent and children), and ambient
mobility is objective (an ambient is moved by a process in the parent ambient)
and implemented in terms of agents (higher-order) communication. In [14],
interface types are introduced for describing the requests that an ambient may
accept from its surrounding environment and are then used to type mobile
ambients and \their mobility", i.e., to allow one to declare, for each ambient,
the type of the ambients that can enter or exit it.
Finally, a few type disciplines have been developed also for the boxed ambi-
ents calculus. In [5], a type system is dened that permits to fully control the
types of the values exchanged in ambients interactions. In [6], a security type
system is introduced that permits to control resources access by implementing
policies for mandatory access control that rely on a security level associated
to each ambient.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have presented GBA, an extension of Boxed Ambients with
guardians. Similar extensions can be given for other ambient-based calculi.
Indeed, we have massaged BA to make apparent the general pattern for these
extensions. Also the open primitive of Mobile Ambients can be handled con-
sistently with the general principle \one name one policy", simply by dropping
the guardian of the ambient destroyed by open. We envisage three directions
for further research on GBA:

Proof techniques for establishing security properties. More specically, as-
suming complete knowledge of certain guardians and processes (the trusted
ones), we would like to derive properties of a complete system, which may
include unreliable processes and guardians. [41] proposes a general frame-
work for dening security policies. Since guardians are a particular case of
execution monitoring, the only properties that we can hope to enforce are
safety properties.

Implementation issues. The distributed abstract machines for Mobile Am-
bients [22] and for Safe Ambients [39] represent useful starting point. Prob-
ably, one may have to consider a more restricted language for guardians,
identied after a more careful analysis of relevant examples.

Language extensions with more powerful guardians. Two kinds of extension
appear of interest: increase the monitoring ability of guardians, give to
guardians the ability to act. In both cases the syntax for processes should
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be unchanged, while the syntax of guardians (and nets with guardians)
may change. One could envisage another kind of extension, namely give to
processes the ability to modify guardians. However, this could introduce
security problems. In fact, guardians are the entities which dynamically
enforce security policies, thus it is dangerous to give to (untrusted) processes
the ability to modify (trusted) guardians.
We list some of the language extensions that make guardians more powerful:

Associate to each sub-ambient a unique local stamp, which is visible only
to the guardian of the parent ambient, when an ambient moves it receives a
new local stamp from the destination ambient. In this way a guardian can
discriminate between sub-ambients with the same name.

Partition processes into local regions, which are visible only to the guardian
of the ambient. In this way the guardian can give dierent privileges to
processes in dierent regions.

Give to a guardian the ability to react to attempts by processes to perform
actions that are denied by it or other guardians.

Give to a guardian the ability to spawn processes or to augment and trans-
form the actions of processes under its control.
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